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Abstract

This article constitutes a new contribution to the analysis of overlapping instruments to cover
the same emission sources. Using both an analytical and a numerical model, we show that
when the risk that the CO2 price drops to zero and the political unavailability of a CO2 tax (at
least in the European Union) are taken into account, it can be socially optimal to implement
an additional instrument encouraging the reduction of emissions, for instance a renewable
energy subsidy. Our analysis has both a practical and a theoretical purpose. It aims at giving
economic insight to policymakers in a context of increased uncertainty concerning the future
stringency of the European Emission Trading Scheme. It also gives another rationale for the
use of several instruments to cover the same emission sources, and shows the importance of
accounting for corner solutions in the definition of the optimal policy mix.

Highlights:
B We develop an analytical and a numerical model of the EU energy and carbon markets.
B We add uncertainty on energy demand and focus on instruments for emission reduction.
B We analyze the economic implications of a risk that the CO2 price drops to zero.
B We show that it can be socially optimal to add an instrument to the EU-ETS.
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1

Introduction

All countries and regions which have implemented climate policies seem to rely on several
policy instruments, some of which cover the same emission sources, rather than a single one1 . For
example, in the European Union, CO2 emissions from the power sector are directly or indirectly
covered by the EU Emission Trading System (Ellerman et al., 2010), by energy-efficiency standards
and energy-efficiency labels on electric motors and appliances (UE, 2009), by CO2 or energy taxes
(in some Member States), by energy-efficiency obligations2 (in some Member States), and by
renewable energy power (REP) subsidies, in the form of feed-in tariffs or REP portfolio obligations
(in virtually all Member States). This multiplicity of policy instruments is in sharp contrast to
the so-called Tinbergen rule (Tinbergen, 1952) which states that achieving a given number of
targets requires that policymakers control an equal number of instruments. Unsurprisingly, this
multiplicity has generated criticism by some economists who argue that the policy instruments
which complement the EU ETS do not reduce CO2 emissions (which are capped) but reduce the
allowance price on the ETS market and generate costly economic distortions (Cf. for instance
Böhringer and Keller (2011), Braathen (2007), Fischer and Preonas (2010) or Tol (2010)). Indeed,
some abatement options, such as REP sources, are covered by several instruments and benefit
from a higher implicit CO2 price than others, such as coal-to-gas switch. The mix of instruments
promoting the same abatement options is therefore suboptimal, at least in a simple economic
model, as it disregards the equimarginal principle.
Yet, the multiplicity of policy instruments has been justified by some other economists, on
several grounds. First, and most obviously, other policy targets such as energy security or air
pollution reduction can be cut by some CO2 abatement options such as wind energy, but not (or
less so) by others, such as coal-to-gas switch. Second, induced technical change may be higher
for some options than for others. For instance, the deployment of photovoltaic panels is likely to
induce more technical change than coal-to-gas switch (see Fischer and Newell (2008) for a review).
Third, the slow diffusion of clean technology justifies implementing more costly but higher potential
options, such as photovoltaic panels, before the cheaper but lower potential options, such as coalto-gas switch (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2011). Fourth, some market failures, regulatory failures
or behavioral failures may reduce the economic efficiency of market-based instruments and justify
additional policy instruments. For instance, the landlord-tenant dilemma reduces the efficiency
of CO2 pricing and can justify energy-efficiency standards in rented dwellings (de T’Serclaes and
Jollands, 2007), while regulatory failures may lead to a too low CO2 price, or prevent governments
to commit to a high enough future CO2 price (Hoel, 2012).
Our aim is not to discuss these justifications, but to introduce and discuss another rationale:
the impact of uncertainty on abatement costs combined to the unavailability of the first-best
instrument. It is well known since Weitzman (1974) that under uncertainty, the relative slope of
the marginal cost and marginal benefit curve is key to choose between a price instrument (e.g.
a CO2 tax) and a quantity instrument (e.g. a cap-and-trade system, like the EU-ETS). More
specifically, in the simplest form of Weitzman’s (1974) model, the quantity instrument should be
chosen if the marginal benefit curve is steeper than the MAC curve while the price instrument
should be chosen if the MAC curve is steeper. If the marginal benefit curve is completely flat then
a tax (set at the expected marginal benefit) is the first-best instrument. In the case of climate
change control, most researchers have concluded that on this ground, a tax should be preferred to
a cap-and-trade system (e.g. Pizer (1999)). Indeed the marginal benefit curve for CO2 abatement
over a few years period is relatively flat because CO2 is a stock pollutant (Newell and Pizer, 2003).
Actually, this argument is even stronger for policies covering only a small part of total emissions,
such as the EU ETS; hence, with an uncertain MAC curve, an ETS is less efficient than a tax, i.e.
it brings a lower expected welfare.
Yet, in the EU, a meaningful CO2 tax is out of reach because fiscal decisions are made under the
1 The unconvinced reader is invited to look at the National Communications to the UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/
national_reports/items/1408.php
2 Lees (2012) provides a recent survey of these systems in Europe, while Giraudet et al. (2012) discuss the costs
and benefits of these systems.

6

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper742

2

Lecuyer and Quirion: Can Uncertainty Justify Overlapping Policy Instruments to Mi

unanimity rule, while a cap-and-trade system has been adopted thanks to the qualified majority
rule which applies to environmental matters (Convery, 2009). Another main reason why cap-andtrade was chosen was for political economy reason in order to be able to alleviate opposition of e.g.
power producers by means of free allocation of emission permits (Böhringer and Lange, ming).
The fact that the EU ETS is not optimal is illustrated by its history since its introduction in
2005, which shows how volatile the CO2 price can be: it dropped to virtually zero in 2007 because
allowance allocation in phase I was too generous (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008), recovered up to
more than 30e/tCO2 because allocation in phase II was tighter and dropped again sharply in
2009 following the economic crisis, down to 8e/t CO2 in October 2012. While economists disagree over the marginal benefit of CO2 abatement, commonly called the “social cost of carbon”
(Perrissin Fabert et al., 2012), they would presumably agree that such a price evolution is inefficient: in some periods, the CO2 price has prompted relatively expensive abatement options (up to
30e/t CO2 ) while in other periods, cheaper abatement options have not been implemented. This
potentially provides a rationale for correcting the ETS and/or for complementing it. Among the
proposed corrections is the introduction of a price cap and a price floor. Since this proposal has
been widely debated (e.g. Hourcade and GHERSI (2002)), we will not address it in this paper.
Conversely, to our knowledge only two papers have addressed the role of uncertainty on abatement costs on the effectiveness of multiple instruments. Mandell (2008) show that under some
conditions, it is more efficient to regulate a part of emissions by a cap-and-trade program and the
rest by an emission tax, than to use a single instrument. Admittedly, under such a mixed regulation, the marginal abatement cost (MAC) differs across emission sources, which is inefficient, but
the emission volume is generally closer to the ex post optimum than under a single instrument:
following an increase in the MAC, the tax yields too high an emission level while the cap-and-trade
system yields a level which is too low, so these inefficiencies partly cancel out.
The other paper is by Hoel (2012, section 9) who studies the opportunity to subsidize REP
in case of an uncertain future carbon tax. He studies the case of scientific uncertainty (damages
caused by climate change are uncertain) and political uncertainty (the current government knows
that there might be a different government in the future, and that this government may have a
different valuation of emissions). He shows that scientific uncertainty justifies a subsidy to REP
if REP producers are risk-averse. Under political uncertainty, results are more complex. If the
current government expects the future government to have a lower valuation of emission reductions
than itself, this tends to make the optimal subsidy positive. Hoel (2012) studies the impact of
uncertainty, but only when the subsidy is combined to a tax, not when it is combined to an ETS
— which is what the present article focuses on.
While we also address the role of uncertainty concerning abatement costs on the effectiveness
of multiple instruments, our focus is on whether it makes sense to use several instruments to cover
the same emission sources and not to cover different sources, as in Mandell’s article (Mandell,
2008). More precisely, we assume that the EU cannot implement a CO2 tax because of the abovementioned unanimity rule but can implement an ETS. However some CO2 abatement options (for
illustration, REP) can be incentivised by a price instrument (in this case, a subsidy to REP, e.g.
a feed-in tariff). In our model, without uncertainty on the energy demand level (and hence on
abatement costs) or if uncertainty is low enough, using the REP subsidy in addition to the ETS
is not cost-efficient because there is no reason to give a higher subsidy to REP than to other
abatement options. However we show that this uncertainty provides a rationale for using the REP
subsidy in addition to the ETS, if it is large enough to entail a possibility of a nil CO2 price. Even
though the first-best policy would be a CO2 tax, when the latter is unavailable, using both a REP
subsidy and an ETS may provide a higher expected welfare than using an ETS alone.
We demonstrate this result using three approaches. Section 2 presents the intuition in a
graphical approach. Section 3 develops an analytical model and presents some key analytical
results based on the same intuition. Section 4 further completes the model and presents a numerical
application on the European power sector. Section 5 concludes.
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Figure 1: Setting the optimal cap for an ETS under low uncertainty (left panel) and large
uncertainty (right panel)

2

The possibility of a nil CO2 price: justification and implications
for instrument choice

As explained above, the main conclusion of our model is that using a REP subsidy in addition
to the ETS improves expected welfare in so far as uncertainty on the demand level is large enough
to entail a possibility of a nil CO2 price, i.e. if there is a possibility that demand for GHG
quotas turns out to be so low, compared to its expected value, that the ETS cap becomes nonbinding. Such a possibility is not accounted for in Weitzman’s seminal Prices vs. Quantities paper
(Weitzman, 1974), or in the related literature. Hence, before presenting our model, we explain in
the present section why we consider that this possibility should be accounted for and, using simple
graphs, why it qualitatively changes Weitzman’s paper conclusions.
Existing experiences with cap-and-trade systems indicate that an allowance price dropping
to zero in an ETS is not unrealistic at all — it might even be seen as the rule rather than the
exception. In the EU ETS, the CO2 price dropped to zero at the end of the first period (in 2007).
It would have done so in the second period (2008-1012) again without the possibility to bank
allowances for the next period (2013-2020) and the likelihood of a political intervention to sustain
the price. In the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which covers power plant CO2
emissions from North-Eastern US states, phase one carbon emissions fell 33% below cap (Point
carbon, 2012). Consequently, the price remained at the auction reserve price, below 2$/tCO2 .
The cap also turned out to be higher than emissions in the tradable permit program to control air
pollution in Santiago, Chile (Coria and Sterner, 2010) and in the UK greenhouse gas ETS (Smith
and Swierzbinski, 2007). Even in the US SO2 ETS, the price is now below 1$/tSO2 (Schmalensee
and Stavins, 2012), vs. more than 150$/tSO2 ten years before, because new regulations and the
decrease in high-sulphur fuels consumption have reduced emissions below the cap.
The implications of the possibility of a nil CO2 price on optimal policy instrument choice are
illustrated on Figure 1. For our purpose, it is more convenient to draw the marginal benefit and
cost as a function of emissions rather (as in Weitzman’s paper) than as a function of abatement,
because we are interested in the uncertainty of unabated emissions. Let’s assume that the Marginal
Benefit MB is known with certainty and is perfectly flat. Let’s further assume than the MAC curve
is uncertain and can take with an equal probability two values, MAC+ and MAC-3 . On the left
panel, uncertainty is lower (MAC- and MAC+ are closer) than on the right panel.
Since the marginal benefit MB is known with certainty and perfectly flat, a price instrument
(like a CO2 tax) is optimal, both ex ante and ex post. On the opposite, a quantity instrument (like
3 Noted

MC in Weitzman (1974).
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an emission cap or the EU-ETS) is generally not optimal ex post because the cap does not follow
the (ex post) optimal emission level. Let’s analyze how a risk-neutral policy maker minimizing
expected cost (or maximizing expected welfare) would set the cap.
On the left panel, with a low uncertainty, the policy maker would set the optimal cap at the
intersection between the marginal benefit and the expected MAC curve (the dotted-dashed line).
This is also the expected emission level under a price instrument. The expected CO2 price would
then equal the marginal benefit4 , although ex post, the CO2 price would be either higher (pCO2 +)
or lower (pCO2 -) than expected (E[pCO2 ]). The cost of the quantity instrument compared to the
price instrument (or to the optimum) is given by the red triangle (in case of a higher than expected
cost) or by the blue triangle (in case of a lower than expected cost). All this is consistent with
Weitzman’s standard model.
Conversely, on the right panel which features a large uncertainty, setting the optimal cap at
the intersection between the marginal benefit and the expected MAC curve (vertical solid line)
does not minimize the expected cost: such a cap would not be binding in the MAC- state, but
it would entail a significant cost, both in the MAC- state (the blue triangle) and in the MAC+
state (the red triangle). A better solution is to set a more lenient cap which equalizes the MAC
and benefit only in the MAC+ state: the extra cost compared to the price instrument would then
be nil in the MAC+ state while it would still equal the blue triangle in the MAC- state. In other
words, the policymaker now neglects the MAC- state, knowing that in such an eventuality, the
cap is non-binding anyway; rather he sets the cap which is optimal is the high-cost state.
Notice that in the MAC+ state, the MAC equals the marginal benefit; hence the welfare loss
from a marginal additional effort would only be of the second order. Conversely, in the low-cost
state, the MAC is below the marginal benefit; hence the welfare gain from a marginal additional
effort would be of the first order. Consequently, an additional policy instrument might improve
welfare even if it entails additional abatement in both states of nature, and even if it is imperfect,
i.e. more costly than CO2 pricing — for example, because it targets only a subset of abatement
options, like a REP subsidy.
Having explained the intuition of our main results, we now turn to the presentation of the
analytical model.

3

Key analytical results in an idealized power market

In order to examine more in detail the implications on the power sector of a possible nil CO2
price, we model an idealized European power market in which power demand is uncertain and can
have two different levels in the future. This uncertainty can be related to the uncertain marginal
abatement cost of the previous section, as a higher/lower power demand will lead to a higher/lower
abatement effort for a given emission cap and thus a higher/lower marginal cost.
The next subsection describes the model and presents the equations. Following subsections
highlight some key analytical results building on the assumptions presented in previous section.

3.1

Analytical framework and equations

The model represents three types of agents: a regulator, representative power producers and
representative consumers. The regulator maximizes an expected welfare function by choosing the
optimal level of various instruments depending on the available instrument set: a carbon tax, an
emission cap for the power sector or a REP subsidy. The emission cap can be interpreted as an
idealized representation of the EU-ETS. The future level of demand is uncertain, with a risk that
the carbon price drops to zero in case of low demand. The power market is assumed to be perfectly
competitive and we assume a 100% pass-through of the emission allowance.
4 This

equality (in expectation) between the price instrument and the quantity instrument regarding price and
quantity is dubbed “certainty equivalence” by Hoel and Karp (2001). They show that while the equivalence prevails
with additive uncertainty (a shift of the MAC curve as in Weitzman’s original paper), it does not under multiplicative
uncertainty (a change in the slope of the MAC curve). In this paper, we show that even with additive uncertainty
on abatement costs, this principle does not prevail if there is a possibility that the price drops to zero.
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The model is a two-stage framework. In the first stage, the regulator chooses the level of the
various policy instruments, facing an uncertainty about the level of future power demand. In
the second stage, the power producers maximize their profit given the carbon tax, the emission
cap, the subsidy and the demand function. The model is solved backwards. In a first step, we
determine the reaction functions of the producers as a function of policy instruments for various
demand states. In a second step, we solve the expected welfare-maximization problem of the
regulator over all states to find the optimal levels of the policy instruments.
3.1.1

Step 1: the producer profit maximization problem

We consider two types of power generation: fossil fuels (f ) and REP (r). The power producers
can also make abatement investments (a) to comply with the emission cap. Those abatements are
assumed for simplicity to be independent from the level of fossil-based production. They refer for
instance to investments making coal-fueled power plants able to cope with some share of biomass,
CCS investments or allowance purchases on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) market.
p is the electricity wholesale price.
Producers face an aggregate emission cap Ω and benefit from a REP subsidy ρ. φ is the
carbon price emerging from the allowance market, equal to the shadow value of the emission cap
constraint. We assume a 100% pass-through from allowance costs to wholesale price. The producer
maximizes its profit Π (Table 1 describes all the variables and parameters).
max Π(p, f, r, a, φ) = p · f + (p + ρ) · r − Cf (f ) − Cr (r) − AC(a) − P C(f, a, φ)
f,r,a

(1)

where Cf (f ) and Cr (r) are the technical production costs from fossil fuel and REP respectively.
We assume decreasing returns for REP and constant returns for emitting power plants (Cf0 (f ) >
0, Cr0 (r) > 0, Cf00 (f ) = 0 and Cr00 (r) < 0). The decreasing returns assumption is due to the fact
that the best production sites are used first and that further REP development implies investing
in less and less productive sites. On the contrary, emitting technologies such as combined cycles
power plants or advanced coal power plants are easily scalable and thus do not generate a scarcity
rent (Fischer, 2010, Fischer and Preonas, 2010, Jonghe et al., 2009). AC(a) is the Abatement Cost
function of the power producers, independent of fossil or REP production and P C(f, a, φ) is the
allowance Purchasing Cost. The technical costs functions have a classical linear-quadratic form:
Cf (f ) = ιf · f
Cr (r) = ιr · r +

r2
2σr

σa 2
a
2
P C(f, a, φ) = φ · (τ · f − a)
AC(a) =

With ιf and ιr the intercepts (iota like intercept) of the fossil fuel and the REP marginal supply
function respectively and σr the slope (sigma like slope) of the REP marginal supply function. σa
is the slope of the MAC curve for the power producer and τ is the average unabated emission rate
from fossil fuel-based power production. We define a linear downward sloping electricity demand
function d(p) (with d0 (p) < 0) whose intercept depends on the state of the world. We consider
two different states which are equally probable, one with a high demand (d+ (p)) and one with a
low demand (d− (p)). The demand function is defined as:
ds (p) = ιd ± ∆ − σd · p
with the intercept being ιd + ∆ in the high demand state of the world and ιd − ∆ in the low
demand state. The equilibrium conditions on the power and the emission market thus depend on
the state of the world.
fs + rs = ds (p)

(2)
10
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Dimension
f
r
p
e
a
φ
ρ
Ω
σa
σe
σr
σd
δ
∆
τ
ιf
ιr
ιd
ιe

(MWh)
(MWh)
(e/MWh)
(tCO2 )
(tCO2 )
(e/tCO2 )
(e/MWh)
(tCO2 )
(e/ tCO2 2)
(e/ tCO2 2)
(MWh2/e)
(MWh2/e)
(e/ tCO2 )
(MWh)
(tCO2 /MWh)
(e/ MWh)
(e/ MWh)
(e/ MWh)
(e/ tCO2 )

Description
Electricity from fossil fuels
Electricity from REP sources
Wholesale power price
Abatements from the non-power sector
Abatements from the power sector
Carbon price
REP subsidy
Emission cap
Slope of the power sector MACC
Slope of the aggregate CITL sector MACC
Slope of the demand function
Slope of the RE supply function
Marginal environmental damage
Variance of demand
Average emission rate of fossil fuels
Intercept of the fossil fuel supply function
Intercept of the RE supply function
Intercept of the demand function
Intercept of the aggregate CITL sector MACC

Table 1: Variables and parameters used in the models.
is the demand constraint. In each state of the world, the power supply has to meet the demand
on the power market.
(
(
?
?
− a?+ = Ω
τ · f+
− a?− < Ω
τ · f−
(3)
or
φ?+ > 0
φ?− = 0
expresses the joint constraint on emissions and CO2 price. In the high-demand state of the world,
total emissions cannot be higher than the cap Ω and the CO2 price is therefore strictly positive.
In the low-demand state, we assume that the emission cap constraint is non-binding, hence the
CO2 price is nil.
The first order conditions of the producer maximization problem are the following:
p?s = ιf + τ φ?s

(4)

Fossil fuel producers will equalize marginal production costs with the wholesale market price, net
from the price of emissions.
ρ + p?s = ιr +

rs?
σr

(5)

REP producers will equalize marginal production costs with the wholesale market price, net from
the subsidy.
σa a?s = φ?s

(6)

Fossil fuel producers will equalize MAC with the carbon price.
The values of the market variables (p, f, r, a, φ) as a function of policy instruments are found
by solving the system of equations (2) to (6). They represent the reaction functions of the power
producer.
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3.1.2

Step 2: the regulator’s expected welfare maximization problem

The regulator, assumed risk-neutral, faces an uncertain future demand and has a limited
number of possible policy instruments (i.e. an emission cap and a REP subsidy) to achieve its
objective of maximizing the following expected welfare function:
max EW (Ω, ρ) =
Ω,ρ

X 1
(CS(p) + Π(p, f, r, a, φ) − dam(f, a) − ρ · r + P C(f, a, φ))
2
states

(7)

Where 12 is the probability of the state of the world +/−, CS(p) is the consumer surplus and
dam(f, a) is the environmental damage function from the GHG emissions. The last two terms of
the expected welfare cancel pure transfers between agents included in the profit functions. The
consumer surplus CS and the damage function are defined as follow:
Z p
CS(p) =
d−1 (q)dq − p · d(p)
0

dam(f, a) =δ · (τ f − a)
With δ the constant environmental damage coefficient (Newell and Pizer, 2003). After having
substituted the market variables in the expected welfare function (7) with the reaction functions
coming from the producer problem we maximize the expected welfare. The first-order conditions
give the optimal levels of the policy instruments across all states (ρ? and Ω? ).

3.2

Social optimum when the CO2 price is nil in the low demand state

Proposition 1. When the CO2 price is nil in the low-demand state of the world, the optimal
renewable subsidy is strictly positive.
Proof. The optimal levels of the policy instruments across all states are given by solving the
first-order conditions of the welfare maximization problem (7).
σa (∆ + ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ))τ + δ(−1 − σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
σa
2
δ
·
τ
·
(1
+
σ
(σ
+
σ
)τ
)
a d
r
ρ? =
2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2

Ω? =

(8)
(9)

knowing that all parameters are positive, and using the reaction functions from the profit maximisation problem (1), we can write:
0 <ρ? < δτ

(10)

Results follow directly.
If we consider only one certain state, then we fall back on the first-best optimum characterized
by a REP subsidy equal to zero and the emission cap set so as to equalize the carbon price with
the marginal damage δ. We see here in (10) that the optimal subsidy is a portion of the marginal
environmental damage (see also (12) below).
By substituting the optimal levels of policy instruments in the reaction functions, we obtain
the socially optimal level of all market variables for both states of demand (see Appendix A). The
optimal level of abatement is proportional to the carbon price. There is no abatement (apart from
investment in REP) in the low demand state of the world, as we assumed the emission cap to
be non-binding (and hence the carbon price to be nil). In both states, the wholesale price level
equals the marginal production cost of fossil energy. When the cap is binding and independent
abatements help mitigate emissions, equilibrium expressions reflect the substitutions between the
various options in order to comply with the cap (direct abatements, fossil fuel reductions and
REP).
12
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While in a first-best world the carbon price equals the marginal environmental damage, in this
second-best setting, the optimal carbon price (in the high-demand state) is lower because the REP
subsidy also reduces emissions. The expected carbon price is equal to:
φ?+ + φ?−
δ + δσa σd τ 2
=
2
2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2
and can be rewritten as:
φ?+ + φ?−
=
2
2+

δ

(11)

σa σr τ 2
1+σa σd τ 2

where it is obvious that the expected carbon price is only a portion of the marginal environmental
damage. The term in the denominator expresses the substitutions taking place when the abatement
through carbon pricing only is no longer optimal.
Proposition 2. When the CO2 price is nil in the low-demand state of the world, the marginal
benefit equals a linear combination of the expected carbon price and the renewable subsidy equivalent
in e/tCO2 .
Proof. Combining (9) and (11) gives:
φ? + φ?−
ρ?
+ +
=δ
τ
2

(12)

The proof follows directly.
φ? +φ?

?

In (12), ρτ is the marginal abatement effort through REP promotion and + 2 − is the marginal
abatement effort through carbon pricing. The simple intuition behind this result is that since the
CO2 price no longer equalizes MAC and marginal benefits as in Weitzman’s model, the additional
instrument, e.g. the REP subsidy, is also used to reduce emissions.

3.3

Expected emissions with various instrument mixes

As mentioned in section 2, Weitzman’s model (Weitzman, 1974) with an additive uncertainty
on the MAC curve respects the principle of certainty equivalence. In other words the optimal
policy is unchanged if random variables are replaced by their expected values.
Proposition 3. When the CO2 price is nil in the low-demand state of the world, the principle
of certainty equivalence does not hold and expected emissions, along with expected damages, vary
with the instrument mix.
Proof. We compute expected emissions in three instrument mix settings:
• first best, with a unique CO2 price across all states of the world;
• second-best, with an ETS and a REP subsidy and a nil CO2 price in the low state of
demand (as shown in the model description above);
• third best, with an ETS alone and a nil CO2 price in the low state of demand.
δ(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
σa
δ(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )2
E[emiss2B ] =(ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ))τ −
σa (2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 )
δ(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
E[emiss3B ] =(ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ))τ −
2σa
E[emiss1B ] =(ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ))τ −

(13)
(14)
(15)

where we see that E[emiss1B ] < E[emiss2B ] and E[emiss2B ] < E[emiss3B ].
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Parameter

Meaning of an increase in the
parameter

Sign of partial
derivative

σa

Higher abatement cost

–

σd

More elastic power demand

+

σr

Cheaper REP

+

δ

Higher marginal damage

+

∆

Higher demand variance

–

τ

Higher emission rate of fossil fuels

?

Table 2: Signs of partial derivatives of the boundary function with respect to parameters (indicates a negative partial derivative, + indicates a positive partial derivative and ? indicates an
ambiguous sign).
The expected damages are different in the three settings. They are lower in the second best
setting (14) than in the third (15) and even lower with a first best carbon tax (13).
Other variables change when comparing first best, second best and third best. The expected
CO2 price is lowest in the second best setting when it is optimal to implement a REP subsidy
along with the emission cap. The drop between first best and second best is mostly due to the
nil CO2 price in the low demand state of the world. When comparing third best and second best,
the CO2 price is lower because another instrument, the REP subsidy, is now also used to reduce
emissions.

3.4

Boundary condition for having a nil CO2 price in the low demand state
of the world

As we have seen, the possibility that the CO2 price becomes nil has important consequences.
It is thus useful to know when this possibility occurs. In this aim, we take the value of φ?− in
a model without the additional non-negativity constraint on the carbon price (see Appendix B).
When unconstrained, the carbon price in the low demand state has the following form:
φ?− = δ −

∆σa τ
1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2

Proposition 4. The carbon price is more likely to drop to zero as mitigation options (abatements
and REP) become expensive, uncertainty on the level of the power demand is large, the demand is
inelastic and the environmental damage is low.
Proof. Let us define a boundary function:
Ψ(δ, ∆, σa , τ, σd , σr ) = δ −

∆σa τ
1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2

Having an unconstrained carbon price φ?− lower than zero is equivalent to having a negative
boundary function (Ψ(δ, ∆, σa , τ, σd , σr ) < 0). The value of Ψ(·) is more likely to be negative as it
is decreasing. The proof then follows from the analysis of the vector of partial derivatives of Ψ(·).
Table 2 shows the sign of the partial derivative of Ψ(·) with respect to the parameters. Higher
mitigation costs lead to a less stringent emission cap Ω, lowering the carbon price in both states of
demand and increasing the risk of a nil CO2 price. A higher marginal damage and a more elastic
power demand (which means higher energy savings for a given change in power price) lead to a
more stringent cap.
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?
?
?
–
–

Low(–)
High (+)
Low(–)
High (+)
Low(–)

–

Low(–)
?

+

High (+)
High (+)

f
fossil
fuel

Level of
demand
(state)

+

+

?

?

–

+

+

–

REP

r

0

]0;1[

0

]-1;0[

0

]0;1[

0

]-1;0[

0

1

0

]-1;0[

0

]0;1[

0

<-1

0

1

0

]-1;0[

0

]0;1[

0

]-1;0[

p
a
φ
electricity
abatements CO2 price
price

Table 3: Market variables’ elasticity with respect to various parameters. ]-1;0[ indicates an elasticity between 0 and -1; ]0;1[ indicates an elasticity
between 0 and 1; + or – indicate respectively a positive or negative elasticity; ? indicates an ambiguous sign of the elasticity.

Higher marginal damage

δ

More elastic power
demand

σd

Cheaper REP

Higher abatement cost

σa

σr

Meaning of an increase
in the parameter

Param.
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Parameter

Meaning of an increase in
the parameter

ρ: REP
subsidy

Ω: Emission
cap

σa

Higher abatement cost

]0;1[

+

σd

More elastic power demand

]-1;0[

–

σr

Cheaper REP

]0;1[

?

δ

Higher marginal damage

1

–

Table 4: Elasticity of instrument variables with respect to various parameters. ]-1;0[ indicates
an elasticity between 0 and -1; ]0;1[ indicates an elasticity between 0 and 1; + or – indicate
respectively a positive or negative elasticity; ? indicates an indeterminate sign of the elasticity.

3.5

Variables’ elasticity with respect to parameters

As a preliminary step to the numerical sensitivity analysis presented in Section 4, Table 3 and
Table 4 show the sign of the elasticity of all variables with respect to various parameters, and
indicate whether they are above or below 1.
Proposition 5. the optimal subsidy ρ? rises as abatement is more expensive, production from REP
sources is cheaper, power demand is less elastic to electricity price and the marginal environmental
damage from GHG emissions rises.
Proof. Table 4 shows the sign of variation of the optimal levels of policy instruments when various
parameters change5 . A positive elasticity indicates a positive variation when a parameter increases,
and an absolute elasticity smaller than one indicates that a 1% change in that parameter will cause
a less than 1% change in the variable. We see that the elasticity of ρ with respect to σa and σr is
positive but smaller than 1, with respect to σd it is negative but smaller than one and the elasticity
with respect to δ is 1. The proof follows directly.
The explanation of this result is straightforward: more REP should be installed when the environmental damage is higher, when REP are cheaper and when the other ways to reduce emissions,
i.e. abatement and energy savings become more expensive. Similarly, a higher abatement cost
naturally leads to a less stringent emission cap Ω, while a higher marginal damage and a more
elastic power demand (which means higher energy savings for a given change in power price) lead
to a more stringent cap. The impact of cheaper REP on the optimal cap is ambiguous: on the
one hand, it reduces the overall cost of cutting emissions, leading to a more stringent cap, but on
the other hand it pushes to an increased use of the other policy instrument, the subsidy, which
minors the importance of the emission cap.
Table 3 shows that in state –, there is no abatement, the carbon price is nil and the power
price is solely determined by the supply curve, so the parameters considered in Table 3 have no
effect on these variables. However, they have an indirect effect on f− and r− since they impact ρ.
Hence, the considered parameters increase the amount of REP r− and they decrease the amount
of fossil-fuel electricity f− when they increase the REP subsidy ρ.
In state +, as one could have expected, more abatement a and a higher CO2 price φ+ are
triggered by a lower abatement cost, a more elastic power demand, more expensive REP, and a
higher marginal damage. Moreover, a higher power price is triggered by a higher marginal damage,
costlier REP, a more elastic power demand and, more surprisingly, a lower abatement cost. The
explanation is that a lower abatement cost implies a more stringent target (Table 4), which in
turn raises the power price in state +.
In state +, changes in energy production follow changes in the CO2 price φ+ : lower abatement
costs, higher marginal damages and a more elastic power demand increase the CO2 price, which
5 Elasticities have been calculated in Mathematica. The Mathematica notebook is available upon request from
the contact author
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in turn decrease the relative competitiveness of fossil fuel. In state –, the CO2 price is nil and
changes are more sensitive to the REP subsidy: higher abatement costs, higher marginal damages
and a more elastic power demand increase the optimal REP subsidy, which in turn increase the
relative competitiveness of REP.
Comparing Table 4 and Table 3 finally shows that the carbon price and the REP subsidy vary
in opposite directions (except when the marginal damage changes). This can be seen in (12).
When the carbon price is nil in the low demand state of the world, the mitigation efforts induced
by the carbon price are no longer sufficient. An additional effort through REP production is
necessary, induced by a strictly positive REP subsidy.

4
4.1

Numerical application : the European power sector and allowance market
Modified model

Having shown some analytical results with a model of a power sector alone, we turn to a slightly
more complex model to show numerical results calibrated on the European power and allowance
market. In this section, we add an explicit allowance supply from non-power CITL sectors. We
therefore add a composite sector including all the other constrained emitters. The power producer
can buy emission allowances (e) from the other constrained sectors on the allowance market to
comply to the emission constraint. The other ETS sectors are represented by their total abatement
cost function, which has the following form:
(
ιe e in state +
σe 2
e −
ACe =
2
0
in state –
where σe is the slope of the aggregate non-electricity ETS sector MACC. The intercepts differ in
the low demand and the high demand state of the world. We assume there is a positive correlation
between the level of power demand and the level of industrial activity. When the power demand
is low, the industrial activity is also low and the allowance surplus is higher.
Next subsections will detail the data and assumptions made to calibrate the model. Some
parameters being subject to a large uncertainty, we use a range of possible values for those parameters and discuss the distribution of results. For each uncertain parameter, we use a discrete
uniform probability distribution and we assume that these parameters are not correlated (except
for the power demand and the industrial activity levels). Table 5 shows the minimum, median
and maximum values of calibrated parameters resulting from the calibration process and used in
the simulations.
We performed simulations with all possible combinations of parameters shown in Table 5,
without any constraint on the carbon price. We tested the positivity of the carbon price, and
when negative in the low demand state, we conducted other simulations by constraining the
carbon price to be equal to zero in the low demand state. This distinguishes two qualitatively
different simulation results. In the first category (subsequently called 2nd Best B), the carbon
price is strictly positive in the low demand state and the renewable subsidy is nil. In the second
category (subsequently called 2nd Best A), the carbon price is nil in the low demand state and
the renewable subsidy is strictly positive. Appendix C details the equations and solution of this
model.

4.2
4.2.1

Data and assumptions for calibration
Supply functions

The supply curves are tuned so as to match estimated long term marginal production costs
functions. According to OECD (2010), the REP production break-even point starts at 60 e/MWh
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Dimension
σa

Description

Min

Median

Max

2

Slope of the power sector MACC

0.44

0.73

2.2

2

Slope of the rest-of-ETS MACC

0.52

0.87

2.61

(e/MtCO2 )

σe

(e/MtCO2 )

σd

(GWh2/e)

Slope of the demand function

2.58

7.73

12.9

σr

(GWh2/e)

Slope of the RE supply function

3.32

9.97

16.6

δ

(e/tCO2 )

Marginal environmental damage

10

20

30

∆

(TWh)

Variance of demand

32.8

65.5

98.3

τ

(tCO2 /MWh)

Average emission rate of fossil fuels

0.6

0.6

0.6

ιf

(e/MWh)

Intercept of the fossil fuel supply function

60

60

60

ιr

(e/MWh)

Intercept of the RE supply function

60

60

60

ιd

(Ge/MWh)

Intercept of the demand function

2.19

2.59

2.99

ιe

(e/tCO2 )

Intercept of the rest-of-ETS MACC (state +)

94.6

158

473

Intercept of the rest-of-ETS MACC (state –)

0

0

0

Table 5: Values of the calibrated parameters.
and goes up to 140 e/MWh. This marginal cost is rather a lower bound, as network and intermittency costs tend to raise it. We calibrated the REP supply function slope so as to reach the
upper limit of the REP long-term marginal cost at a given percentage of a reference production
level. This reference production level is taken equal to the power production from REP and fossil
fuels in 2008, that is 2,060 TWh (ENERDATA, 2011). For the maximal penetration rate of REP,
we took a range of possible percentages, ranging from 10% to 50%. The fossil fuel long term supply curve, set at 60 e/MWh is tuned to an average European CCGT levelized cost of electricity
OECD (2010).
4.2.2

Demand function

The demand function has been calibrated so as to have a given price-elasticity when the demand
equals the average between the 2008 and the 2009 reference production levels (2,060 TWh in 2008
and 1,929 TWh in 2009 (ENERDATA, 2011)). We chose elasticities ranging from 0.1 to 0.5. The
demand standard deviation ∆ between the two states of the world was assumed to be close to the
mean absolute deviation from the reference demand in 2008 and 2009. We chose values ranging
from +50% to -50% of this value to account for the uncertainty on a possible future shock on
demand.
4.2.3

Abatement costs

The slope of the MACC in the power sector has been calculated as follows: given an average
CO2 price of 22e/tCO2 , we assumed that fuel-switch allowed to abate a range of percentages of
the total emissions of the power sector in 2008, ranging from 1 % to 5 %. Ellerman and Buchner
(2008) indicate an abatement of around 5% at a CO2 price equal to 15e/tCO2 . The MACC of the
ETS sector other than power was calibrated in the same way, by assuming a certain percentage of
abatement in 2008 given the CO2 price. We assumed abatements ranging from 1% to 5% for both
sectors. The intercept of the MACC for non-power sectors in the low demand state was calculated
so as to obtain the difference of allowance over-allocation between 2008 and 2009 when the CO2
price drops to zero (102 MtCO2 of allowance surplus in 2008, 241 MtCO2 surplus in 2009; data
from Sandbag (2012). We took into account the perimeter of the CITL combustion sector —
which includes power and heat production — by adding the additional surplus allowances coming

18

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper742

14

Lecuyer and Quirion: Can Uncertainty Justify Overlapping Policy Instruments to Mi

Description

Dimension

Range

Marginal environmental damage

(e/tCO2 )

(10.,20.,...,30)

1

(0.1,0.2,...,0.5)

Abatement from the aggregate
ETS sector for 15 e/tCO2

(%)

(1,2,...,5)

Abatement from the power
sector for 15 e/tCO2

(%)

(1,2,...,5)

Maximum share of REP in the
energy mix

(%)

(10,20,...,50)

Standard deviation of demand

(TWh)

(33,49...,98)

Price-elasticity of demand
(absolute value)

Table 6: Ranges of parameters used in the numerical simulations for calibration purposes. All
possible combinations of parameters were successively simulated.
from the heat plants (41 MtCO2 according to Trotignon and Delbosc (2008)).
4.2.4

Additional parameters

We took an average emission rate of 0.6 tCO2 /MWh for fossil production (IEA Statistics,
2011), and a marginal damage between 10 and 30e/tCO2 . The calibration presented in previous
paragraphs is very cautious, considering demand and production levels already observed in 2008
and 2009. The increased regulatory risk induced by the introduction of the third ETS phase
and possible changes in the future Energy Efficiency Directive are captured through changing the
standard deviation of demand and emission surplus from the non power ETS sector.
Table 6 synthesizes the range of values used for all parameters subject to a large uncertainty.

4.3

Optimal policy instruments and CO2 price levels

With the parameter ranges shown in Table 5, 30.6% of the simulations display a nil carbon
price in the low demand state and a strictly positive REP subsidy and thus belong to the 2nd Best
A category. Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1. They show histograms of the occurrences of the
optimal emission cap Ω? (Fig. 2a) and the optimal REP subsidy ρ? (Fig. 2b) in all 2nd Best A
simulations where the CO2 price turns out to be nil in the low demand state. Figure 2c shows a
histogram of the expected CO2 price.
The optimal emission cap ranges from 1.11 to 1.23 GtCO2 , and the optimal subsidy ranges
from 3.13 to 12.7 e/MWh. The optimal expected CO2 price ranges from 2.33 to 13.4 e/tCO2 .
The relatively low levels of both the expected CO2 price and the REP subsidy are due to the
fact that it is a linear combination of both that equals the marginal damage (see (12)). These
values cannot be directly compared to actual subsidy levels since the latter account for all positive
externalities expected from REP support.

4.4

Expected welfare gains from adding a REP subsidy

In order to evaluate the gains from adding a subsidy to the ETS, we compute the expected
welfare differences between simulations with different instrument mixes. We compare four settings:
• first best (1st Best), with a unique CO2 price across all states of the world (e.g. a
carbon tax);
• second best (2nd Best A), with an ETS and a REP subsidy and a nil CO2 price in the
low state of demand;
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(a) Optimal emission cap (GtCO2 ).
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(c) Expected CO2 price (e/tCO2 ).

Figure 2: Histogram of the number of simulations per optimal policy instrument values and
expected CO2 price for all simulations with a nil carbon price in the low demand state of the
world.
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Figure 3: Box Whisker Plots of expected welfare gains from one scenario to another (BAU to
3rd Best, 3rd Best to 2nd Best A, 2nd Best A to 1st Best) in all scenarios where the CO2 price is
nil in the low demand state of the world.
• third best (3rd Best), with an ETS alone and a nil CO2 price in the low state of demand;
• business-as-usual (BAU), with no policy at all.
The gain — or welfare difference — is calculated as the drop in environmental damages minus
mitigation costs. Fig. 3 shows box whisker plots of the expected welfare gains from one scenario
to another (BAU to 3rd Best, 3rd Best to 2nd Best A, 2nd Best A to 1st Best) in all scenarios where
the CO2 price is nil in the low demand state of the world. Figure 4 shows the same data, with all
simulations ordered along the x-axis according to the 3rd Best to 2nd Best A gain.
The gains from having a carbon tax (1st Best) compared to a 2nd Best situation with an ETS
and a REP subsidy when the CO2 price is nil in the low state of demand are quite important,
ranging from more than 1 billion e to several hundred millions e. The gains of adding an ETS
alone (3rd Best) compared to a situation with no policy at all (BAU) are similar. The gains from
adding a REP subsidy to this ETS range from 12 million e to 462 million e. They represent from
2.18% to 26.6% of the gains of a first best tax.

4.5

Expected emissions, productions and prices with various instrument mixes

Following our analysis in section 3 and illustrating Proposition 3, the Fig. 5 presents box
whisker plots of expected values of different variables in the simulations with a nil CO2 price in
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Figure 4: Distribution of expected welfare gains from one scenario to another (BAU to 3rd Best,
3rd Best to 2nd Best A, 2nd Best A to 1st Best) as a percentage of the total gain of a CO2 tax
in all scenarios where the CO2 price is nil in the low demand state of the world (in percentage
points). Total gains add up to 100%.
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Figure 5: Box Whisker plots of the expected values of various variables in the 1st Best, 2nd Best
A and 3rd Best settings in the simulations with a nil CO2 price in the low state of demand.
the low state of demand. We computed those values in the 1st Best setting (carbon tax), the 2nd
Best A setting (ETS + subsidy) and the 3rd Best setting (ETS alone). Figure 5a presents the
expected emissions, Figure 5b the expected CO2 price, Figure 5c the expected energy production
and Figure 5d the expected wholesale price.
Consistently with Proposition 3, Figure 5a shows that expected emissions are lower in the 2nd
Best A than in the 3rd Best, and the lowest in the 1st Best setting. The expected CO2 price is the
lowest in the 2nd Best A setting. As a result, the wholesale price is also the smallest in the 2nd
Best A setting, but expected energy production is the highest.

4.6

Shift in the optimal emission cap and CO2 price

In order to discuss the optimization behavior of the regulator, we analyze the optimal instrument levels and carbon price in the second best setting for all parameter combinations. For each
combination, the uncertainty on the power demand is either low enough to get an optimal emission cap that is binding in both states of demand (2nd Best B), either too high and implies a nil
CO2 price in the low demand state of the world (2nd Best A). We then compare the two groups
of simulations and show the results as Box Whisker plots in Fig. 6. Fig. 6a shows the optimal
emission cap for all parameter combination, Fig. 6b the REP subsidy, Fig. 6c the CO2 price in
the high demand state of the world and Fig. 6d the CO2 price in the low demand state of the
world.

21

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

17

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 742 [2013]

1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7

10
8
6
4
2
0
2nd Best A

2nd Best B

2nd Best A

(a) Emission cap value (GtCO2 ).

2nd Best B

(b) REP subsidy (e/MWh REP).

60
50
40
30
20
10

20
15
10
5
0
2nd Best A

2nd Best B

2nd Best A

(c) CO2 price in the high state of demand (e/tCO2 ).

2nd Best B

(d) CO2 price in the low state of demand (e/tCO2 ).

Figure 6: Box Whisker plot of various instrument levels and CO2 price in all simulations with
a nil CO2 price in the low state of demand (2nd Best A) and a strictly positive CO2 price in the
low state of demand (2nd Best B).
As already discussed in section 2, Fig. 6a shows a higher emission cap in all 2nd Best A
scenarios. This is due to the fact that when the CO2 price turns out to be nil in the low demand
state, no additional mitigation effort is made in this state and the cap can be optimized on the
high demand level. Fig. 6b, 6c and 6d illustrate Proposition 2. When the CO2 price is nil as for
all 2nd Best A scenarios in Fig. 6d, there is a strictly positive subsidy (2nd Best A scenarios in
Fig. 6b) and the CO2 price in the high demand state of the world drops compared to scenarios
2nd Best B (Fig. 6c).

5

Conclusion

We bring a new contribution to the analysis of the coexistence of several policy instruments
to cover the same emission sources. We show that combining an ETS with e.g. a subsidy to
renewable energy power (REP) is less costly than the ETS alone under certain parameter ranges,
especially if uncertainty on the level of power demand (and hence on the abatement costs) is high
enough. In a context of a very low CO2 price and large anticipated surplus on the EU ETS at
least until 2020, these findings justify the existence of other policy instruments aiming at reducing
CO2 emissions covered by the ETS, at least as long as the EU ETS is not reformed to reduce
allowance supply.
We show that under a reasonable set of parameters, the addition of another policy instrument,
such as a REP subsidy of about 3 to 13 e/MWh can improve welfare by about 2% to 27% of the
total gain of a carbon tax, that is about 12 to 462 million e/yr. This gain is obtained through
CO2 emission reductions alone and does not rely on additional market failures or externalities.
The addition of a REP subsidy also increases the total energy production, decreases the power
price and the CO2 price and reduces the total expected emissions. Our results are in line with
existing literature concerning the decreasing effect of a REP subsidy on the carbon price when it is
combined with an emission cap. We however show that under certain circumstances, interactions
between a subsidy and an emission cap can reduce emissions and improve welfare, compared to
an emission cap alone.
On a more methodological note, our results invite to deepen the reflection on the role of
uncertainty. Noticeably, they hilight of the possibility of corner solutions (in this case, a zero
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CO2 price), when comparing policy instruments and policy packages. In addition to showing that
an optimal policy mix to reduce CO2 emissions can contain more than one instrument, we show
several key analytical results that qualitatively differ from the literature. For instance, expected
emissions are no longer equivalent between policy instruments, even with an additive uncertainty
on the marginal abatement cost, and the optimal emission cap no longer depends on all states of
nature but only on the high-demand one.
Our results are based on the assumption that the risk of the CO2 price dropping to zero cannot
be excluded. The history of many cap-and-trade systems, including the US acid rain program,
RGGI and the EU ETS, fully justifies this assumption, since the allowance price has dropped to
virtually zero (or to the floor price) in all these systems. Moreover, uncertainty on the CO2 price
does not only stem from the business cycle, as in our model, but also from uncertainty on future
policies, such as the Energy Efficiency Directive currently debated in the EU. Our analysis brings
some economic insight into the debate about the future European policy mix and about whether
it is justified or preferable to complement the EU-ETS in its present form.
Further aspects could be worth investigating. Including an allowance floor price for instance
should not change qualitatively our results as long as the floor price is below the marginal damage.
Modeling banking across trading periods with periodic renegotiation of the cap could mitigate the
sub-optimality of the ETS hence the room for complementary policies, but it would seriously
complicate the analysis without necessarily providing new insights. Finally, assuming another
probability distribution for the future demand level could also have an effect on the outcome,
depending on the probability associated with a nil carbon price.
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A

Model with nil CO2 price in the low demand state of the world

Solving the profit maximization problem of the producer gives the reaction functions of producers, depending on the level of policy instruments and the state of the world. Solving the welfare
maximization problem of the regulator knowing all the reaction functions gives the optimal level
of the policy instruments. By substituting the optimal levels of policy instruments in the reaction
functions, we obtain the socially optimal level of all market variables for the high demand state
(subscript +) and low demand (subscript –).
The optimal solution is:
1
)(σa (∆ + ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ))τ + δ(−1 − σa (σd + σr )τ 2 ))
(σa )
(δτ (1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 ))
=
(2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 )
(σr (δτ (−1 − σa (σd + σr )τ 2 ) + ιr (2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 )))
= − ∆ + ιd − ιf (σd + σr ) +
(2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 )
(σr (2ιf − 2ιr + δτ + (ιf − ιr )σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 + δσa (σd + σr )(τ )3 ))
=
(2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 )
=ιf

Ω? =(
ρ?
?
f−
?
r−

p?−

a?− =0
φ?− =0
(δσr τ )
(2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 )
(σr (2ιf − 2ιr + 3δτ + (ιf − ιr )σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 + δσa (3σd + σr )(τ )3 ))
=
(2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 )
(2δτ (1 + σa σd τ 2 ) + ιf (2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 ))
=
(2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 )
(2(δ + δσa σd τ 2 ))
=
(σa (2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 ))
(2(δ + δσa σd τ 2 ))
=
(2 + σa (2σd + σr )τ 2 )

?
f+
=∆ + ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ) − δ(σd + σr )τ −
?
r+

p?+
a?+
φ?+
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B

Model with strictly positive CO2 price in the low demand
state of the world

We assumed through this paper that the carbon price is nil in the low demand state of the
world. This is the case for certain parameter combinations, as discussed in section 3.4. For some
other combinations, the carbon price remains positive in both states, and the model is changed as
follows. Equation (3) becomes:
(
(
?
?
τ · f+
− a?+ = Ω
τ · f−
− a?− = Ω
or
φ?+ > 0
φ?− > 0
The optimal solution changes also and becomes:
(σa (ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ))τ − δ(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 ))
(σa )
ρ? =0

Ω? =

(∆)
(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
(σr (ιf − ιr + δτ − σa (∆ − (ιf − ιr )(σd + σr ))τ 2 + δσa (σd + σr )(τ )3 ))
=
(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
(ιf + δτ + σa (−∆ + ιf (σd + σr ))τ 2 + δσa (σd + σr )(τ )3 )
=
(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
(δ)
(∆τ )
=
−
(σa ) (1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
(∆σa τ )
=δ −
(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
(∆)
=ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ) − δ(σd + σr )τ +
(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
(σr (ιf − ιr + δτ + σa (∆ + (ιf − ιr )(σd + σr ))τ 2 + δσa (σd + σr )(τ )3 ))
=
(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
(ιf + δτ + σa (∆ + ιf (σd + σr ))τ 2 + δσa (σd + σr )(τ )3 )
=
(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
(δ)
(∆τ )
=
+
(σa ) (1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )
(∆σa τ )
=δ +
(1 + σa (σd + σr )τ 2 )

?
f−
=ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ) − δ(σd + σr )τ −
?
r−

p?−
a?−
φ?−
?
f+
?
r+

p?+
a?+
φ?+

C

Model with allowances from non-power ETS sectors and nil
CO2 price in the low demand state of the world

Section 4 extends the model and allows for allowance trading by adding an emitting sector from
which the power producer can buy surplus allowances. This surplus is labeled e and its supply is
modeled by a linear MAC curve. The profit maximization problem becomes:
max Π(p, f, r, a, e, φ) = p · f + (p + ρ) · r − Cf (f ) − Cr (r) − AC(a) − ACe (e) − P Ce (f, a, e, φ)

f,r,a,e

with
σe 2
ACe (e) =
e −
2

(

ιe · e in the low demand state
0
in the high demand state

26

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper742

22

Lecuyer and Quirion: Can Uncertainty Justify Overlapping Policy Instruments to Mi

The allowance purchasing cost is modified as follows:
P Ce (f, a, e, φ) = φ · (τ · f − a + e)
and (3) becomes:
(
?
τ · f−
− a?− < Ω − e?−
φ?− = 0

(
or

?
τ · f+
− a?+ = Ω − e?+
φ?+ > 0

The welfare maximization problem becomes:
max EW (Ω, ρ) =
Ω,ρ

X 1
(CS(p) + Π(p, f, r, a, e, φ) − dame (f, a, e) − ρ · r + P Ce (f, a, e, φ))
2
states

where dame (·) is the modified environmental damage function:
dame (f, a, e) = δ · (τ f − a − e)
The optimal solution of this problem is the following:
(δ(σa + σe ))
+ (∆ + ιd + ιr σr − ιf (σd + σr ))τ − δ(σd + σr )τ 2
(σa σe )
(δτ (σa + σe + σa σe (σd + σr )τ 2 ))
=
(2(σa + σe ) + σa σe (2σd + σr )τ 2 )
(δ(σa + σe )(σr )2 τ )
(δσr (σd + σr )τ )
+
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((2σd + σr )(2(σa + σe ) + σa σe (2σd + σr )τ 2 ))
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=
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=ιf
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Ω? = −
ρ?
?
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?
r−
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(ιe )
(σe )
?
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